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CASE COMMENT
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: FUNDING THE FREE
EXERCISE CLAUSE*
Locke v. Davey, 124 S. Ct. 1307 (2004)
David M Applegate"*
Respondent qualified for the Washington Promise Scholarship,' a statefunded college scholarship designed to assist students with educational
expenses when attending an eligible in state institution.2 To comply with
the Washington State Constitution,3 the Promise Scholarship guidelines
prohibited use of awarded funds for Respondent's pursuit of a degree in
devotional theology.4 Respondent filed suit against the State of
* Editor's Note: This Case Comment received the Huber C. Hurst Award for the
Outstanding Case Comment for Fall 2004.
** J.D. expected May 2006, University of Florida Levin College of Law; B.A. 1999,
Vanderbilt University. I would like to thank all of my friends and family who continue to encourage
and inspire me.
1. Locke v. Davey, 124 S. Ct. 1307, 1310 (2004). Washington established the Promise
Scholarship program in 1999 to assist academically gifted students who may lack the financial
ability to go to college. To be academically eligible, a student must graduate in the top 15% of the
student's Washington high school class, or attain a certain standardized test score (1200 on the SAT
or 27 on the ACT). To be financially eligible, the student's family must have an income below
135% of the state's median income. Respondent applied for and was awarded a Promise
Scholarship of$1125. Id.
2. Id. Scholarship students must enroll at an accredited public or private post-secondary
institution (including those religiously affiliated) in the state of Washington. Id. Respondent
enrolled at Northwest College, a private Christian college, to pursue a double major in pastoral
ministries and business management and administration. Id.
3. Article I, Section 11 of the Washington Constitution states in pertinent part:
Absolute freedom of conscience in all matters of religious sentiment, belief and
worship, shall be guaranteed to every individual, and no one shall be molested or
disturbed in person or property on account
of religion .... No public money
or property shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise
or instruction, or the support of any religious establishment.
WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11.
4. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 250-80-020(12)(g) (2000). "'Eligible student' means a person
who ... [i]s not pursuing a degree in theology." Id.
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Washington in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Washington,' alleging that denial of scholarship funds based on
Respondent's chosen course of study violated the Free Exercise Clause of
the First Amendment.6 The district court rejected Respondent's claims, and
granted summary judgment.7 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit reversed the district court's decision,8 holding that denying an
otherwise eligible student a scholarship based on the student's chosen
major singled out religious instruction, and constituted a violation of the
Free Exercise Clause.9 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, ° and
in reversing the Ninth Circuit's decision, HELD, that Washington's refusal
to fund Respondent's devotional theology instruction did not violate
Respondent's rights under the Free Exercise Clause."
The First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof."' 2 Separately, the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise
Clause serve different purposes, 3 and state action regarding religion often
places the two clauses in tension with one another. 4 However, some state
actions fall within "the joints"'" and are permitted by the Establishment
Clause but not required by the Free Exercise Clause. 6

5. Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748, 751 (9th Cir. 2002). Respondent wished to use the
scholarship to fund a pastoral ministries major, designed to prepare students for Christian ministry.
Id. Respondent initially named defendants as Washington Governor Gary Locke and members of
Washington's Higher Education Coordinating Board (HECB). Id. at 752 n.4. Respondent sought
damages and an injunction preventing the HECB from refusing to award funds, based on a chosen
major, to an otherwise eligible student. Id. at 75 1.
6. Id. at 750. The First Amendment states in relevant part: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." U.S. CONST.
amend. I. The Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution extends this requirement to each
state.
7. Davey, 299 F.3d at 751-52. Both parties moved for summary judgment, but the district
court moved in the state's favor. Id. Respondent timely appealed. Id at 752.
8. Id.at 760. "We conclude that HECB's policy lacks neutrality on its face ..."Id. at 750.
9. Id.at 760.
10. Locke v. Davey, 124 S.Ct. 1307, 1311 (2004).
11. Id.at 1315.
12. U.S. CONST. amend. I.

13. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 542
(observing that "the Free Exercise Clause 'protects religious observers against unequal
treatment."'); see also Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1313-15 (discussing the historical foundation and the
purposes of the Establishment Clause).
14. Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1311 (citing Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 469 (1973)).
15. Id.
16. Id.
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In Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind,7 the
U.S. Supreme Court reviewed whether a Washington state commission
could refuse vocational assistance to a blind student pursuing a religious
education at a Christian college.' 8 The vocational assistance was paid
directly to students.' 9 Students could then apply the aid to the educational
institution of their choice. 2' The Court acknowledged that some religious
institutions might benefit from the state aid program, 2' but found that such
benefits would be the result of the independent choice of the aid
recipient. 2' The Court held that because the state was not directly
contributing to religiously affiliated institutions, the program did not
violate the Establishment Clause.23
Just as the Court has recognized that not all state action benefiting
religion violates the Establishment Clause,24 it has also recognized that not
all action inhibiting religious expression violates the Free Exercise
Clause. 25 In Employment Division v. Smith,26 Respondents were refused

unemployment benefits after they were fired from their jobs for illicit drug
use.27 Respondents used peyote, 2' a controlled substance under Oregon
law,29 for ceremonial purposes in accordance with Native American
religious practices.3" The Court acknowledged that a neutral and generally
applicable law restricting the free exercise of religion is not automatically

17. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
18. Id. at483.
19. Id. at 488. The program provided aid to assist visually handicapped persons to obtain
training "in the professions, business or trades." Id. at 483.
20. Id. at 488.
21. Id.
22. Witters, 474 U.S. at 488. "In this case, the fact that aid goes to individuals means that the
decision to support religious education is made by the individual, not the state." Id.
23. Id. at 488-89. Under this holding, the Court did not require that Washington extend aid
to comply with the Free Exercise Clause, and declined to consider whether the program would
violate Washington's "far stricter" Establishment Clause. Id. at 489.
24. See supra text accompanying notes 13-22.
25. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 874. Respondents were fired from a private drug rehabilitation organization in
Oregon. Respondents then applied for unemployment compensation, but were found ineligible for
such benefits due to work "misconduct." Id.
28. Id. Peyote is a hallucinogen derived from the plant LophophorawilliamsiiLemaire and
is ingested to produce a euphoric effect. Id.
29. Id. In Oregon, peyote is a Schedule I controlled substance, possession of which is a Class
B felony. The only exception exists for controlled substances that are medically prescribed. Id.
30. Smith, 494 U.S. at 874. Respondents were members of the Native American Church. Id.
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void,3 and refused to require a compelling government interest to
withstand scrutiny." Because the interference with Respondents' religious
expression was an incidental effect of regulating otherwise unlawful
conduct,33 the Court held that the Free Exercise Clause had not been
offended.3 4 The Court relegated the decision to excuse sacramental peyote
use to the states. 3
36 the Court
In Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah,
considered whether city ordinances prohibiting the practice of animal
sacrifice violated the Free Exercise Clause. 37 Facing the prospect of a
Santeria church in its community, 3 a city council passed laws essentially
criminalizing animal sacrifice,3 9 a key component of the Santeria religious
practice.' Before analyzing the claim, the Court restated its holding in
Smith.4 The Court then stated the logical antithesis: a law failing to satisfy
of Smith must be
the neutrality or general applicability requirements
42
justified by a compelling government interest.
In determining whether the city ordinances satisfied the neutrality
requirement, the Court evaluated whether the laws targeted suppression of
the Santeria religion.43 The first test used to evaluate the objective of the

31. Id. at 878. "We have never held that an individual's religious beliefs excuse him from
compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate." Id.
at 878-79. The Court also explained that previous decisions invalidating a neutral, generally
applicable law restricting religious expression also involved other constitutional protections. Id.at
881.
32. Id. at 885. However, in her concurrence, Justice O'Connor urged that all neutral laws of
general applicability burdening religious expression should be subject to compelling interest
scrutiny. Id. at 898 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
33. Id.at 882.
34. Id. at 890. "But to say that anondiscriminatory religious-practice exemption is permitted,
or even that it is desirable, is not to say that it is constitutionally required." Id.
35. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890. The Court also noted that many states have made an exception
to their drug laws for sacramental peyote use. Id.
36. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
37. Id.at 520.
38. Id.at 526. The Santeria religion originated in the nineteenth century in Cuba. Members
express their devotion to orishas,spirits that aid in the fulfillment of God's intended destiny. Id.
at 524.
39. Id.at 527.
40. Id.at 525. Sacrifices of chickens, guinea pigs, and other animals are performed to nurture
the orishas, and are performed at numerous occasions and celebrations throughout the year. Id.
41. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 531.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 533.
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laws began with a facial examination of the text itself." Although the
Court found that the ordinances were facially neutral,45 it noted that facial
neutrality alone is not determinative. 46 The Court continued its analysis by
examining the circumstances surrounding the application of the
ordinances. 7 While the ordinances advanced concerns unrelated to
religious animosity, 48 the Court concluded the overall objective of the laws
singled out the Santeria religion. 49 The Court also found the ordinances
were not generally applicable. 5" The Court determined the ordinances were
underinclusive because they targeted conduct motivated only by religious
belief "'

The Court then applied strict scrutiny,5 2 evaluating whether the laws
served compelling government interests and were narrowly tailored.53 The
Court determined the ordinances failed both standards,54 noting that any
law that targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment only survives
strict scrutiny in rare cases.5 After, determining the ordinances failed strict
scrutiny, the Court held the ordinances were enacted contrary to the Free
Exercise Clause and were thus void.56
Before analyzing the instant case under the Free Exercise Clause, the
Court noted the implication of previous decisions based on the

44. Id. The Court noted there are many ways to determine whether a law purposely
suppresses religion, the first of which is an examination of the law's text. Any textual references
to religious practice without discernible secular meaning meant the law lacked facial neutrality, and
would be presumptively unconstitutional. Id.
45. Id. at 534. The Court determined in particular that the words "sacrifice" and "ritual"
appearing in the ordinances, although religious in origin, also have a secular meaning.
46. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 534. "The Free Exercise Clause protects against governmental
hostility which is masked, as well as overt." Id.
47. Id. at 535.
48. Id. The Court noted concerns unrelated to religious animosity, including animal cruelty
and health hazards. Id.
49. Id. Analyzing the ordinances in tandem, the Court determined that the laws devalued
religious reasons for killing animals over nonreligious reasons. Id. at 537.
50. Id. at 545-46. In order to be generally applicable, a law cannot selectively impose burdens
on religious conduct based on belief. Id. at 543.
51. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 542-43. The Court rejected the Respondent's claim that the
ordinances advanced public health and animal cruelty protection, finding the laws failed to prohibit
nonreligious conduct endangering those interests. Id. at 543.
52. Id. at 546.
53. Id. (citing McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 628 (1972)).
54. Id. at 546. Acknowledging that failing either standard would invalidate the ordinances,
the Court determined that the ordinances were both overbroad and lacked compelling government
interests. Id.
55. Id. at 546.
56. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 547.
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Establishment Clause." The Court described the instant case as a "play in
the joints" between state actions permitted under the Establishment
Clause,58 but not required by the Free Exercise Clause.59 Thus, the Court
did not question whether Washington could permit scholarship funding for
students' use pursuing degrees in devotional theology without violating the
Establishment Clause.6" Rather, the Court focused its analysis on whether
Washington could deny that funding without violating the Free Exercise
Clause.6
Relying on Lukumi, the Respondent argued that the Washington
Promise Scholarship lacked facial neutrality and was therefore
presumptively unconstitutional.62 The Court rejected this argument.63
Rather than analyze the instant case according to the standards set forth in
Lukumi, 64 the Court distinguished the factual circumstances and found the
disfavor of religion to be "far milder" than that found in Lukumi.65 Thus,
the Court's refusal to hold the program unconstitutional despite potential
facial bias ended the analysis of the scholarship program's validity. 66 The
Court continued by rejecting the argument that funding must be equally
available for both secular and religious endeavors,67 noting that training for
secular and religious professions are inherently different.68
Acknowledging that the Washington Promise Scholarship program
purposely excluded religion,69 the Court refused to consider this exclusion
57. Locke v. Davey, 124 S. Ct. 1307, 1311 (2004).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1311-12.
60. Id. The Court found there was no question that the Washington Promise Scholarship
program could fund devotional theology education under the U.S. Constitution because the link
between state funds and religious training was broken by the recipient's independent and private
choice. Id.
61. Id. at 1312.
62. Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1312.
63. Id. The Court also rejected the Respondent's claims that the Promise Scholarship program
was unconstitutional under free speech and equal protection basis. Id. at 1312 n.3.
64. Id. The Court declared that relying on Lukumi would extend the case beyond its reasoning
and its factual limits. Id.
65. Id. The Court distinguished the instant case since it did not impose "sanctions" on an
expression of religion. Id.
66. Id. at 1315. The Court declined to further explore neutrality or general applicability. Id.
67. Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1313. Justice Scalia argues that generally available benefits are part
of the "baseline against which burdens on religion are measured." Id. at 1316 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
68. Id at 1313. Emphasizing that training for secular professions and religious professions
were not "fungible," the Court likened a degree in devotional theology as a religious "calling" to
lead a congregation. Id.
69. Id. at 1312.
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as hostile toward religion.7" The Court found that many religiously
affiliated benefits were still available to the Respondent under the program
guidelines. 7' Therefore, the Court concluded that the burden placed on the
Respondent's exercise of religion was relatively minor and did not
outweigh Washington's interest in maintaining a strong policy against
state established religion.72 The Court ultimately held that without facial
bias and therefore a presumption of unconstitutionality, the scholarship
program did not violate the Free Exercise Clause.73
In analyzing whether Washington's Promise Scholarship program
violated the Free Exercise Clause, the Court limited the holding in
Lukumi,7 4 yet maintained policy principles set forth in Smith,75 and
answered questions left open in Witters.76 The Court declined to follow the
clear language of Lukumi requiring strict scrutiny in instances of
discriminatory laws.77 Rather than inquiring whether the Washington
Promise Scholarship program was neutral and generally applicable,78 the
Court instead focused on the factual consequences and impacts on the
Respondent.7 9 The Court ignored the previously followed principle that
laws lacking facial neutrality were presumptively unconstitutional,80 and
found that the consequences of denying the Respondent funding for a
devotional theology degree was insignificant.8" Thus, the Court created an
ambiguous new standard requiring "substantial harm" to justify strict
scrutiny in Free Exercise challenges. 82 As Justice Scalia points out, had the
70. Id. at 1313. The Court noted that occurrences of dealing with ministerial education
differently than secular training was a result of the unique place religion holds in constitutional law,
and was not evidence of state hostility toward religion. Id.
71. Id. at 1315. The Court notes scholarship students may still take devotional theology
classes. Id.
72. Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1315. Justice Scalia describes Washington's interest as a
"philosophical preference" to protect a taxpayer's "freedom of conscience." Id. at 1318 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
73. Id. at 1315.
74. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
75. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
76. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
77. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 531-33.
78. Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1316 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 1314-15.
80. In his dissent, Justice Scalia noted that the majority did not cite to any authority
approving a facially discriminatory law. Id. at 1318 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 1315.
82. Id. at 1319 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia noted that the Court has never required
proof of harm with other forms of discrimination. Id. Scalia then analogized the refusal of
scholarship funds to a financial penalty, thereby meeting any requirement of actual harm under the
majority's opinion. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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instant court invalidated the Promise Scholarship program by following
Lukumi, Washington could have created a neutral and generally applicable
scholarship program that still only funded secular education.83 Instead,
states are no longer required to recognize the broad neutrality principles
84
established in Lukumi and are now invited to single out religious conduct.
Despite the unexplained loss of a standard of review, the Court
maintained consistent policy between the instant case and Smith." Similar
to the Court's refusal in Smith to recognize an affirmative right to religious
peyote use,86 the instant Court refused to recognize an affirmative right to
subsidized religious training.87 Thus, both Smith and the instant decision
allow individual states to decide whether to recognize such rights.88 Had
the instant Court affirmed the lower court's decision, it would have
ignored a long history of state concern regarding established religion.89
Instead, the instant Court reaffirmed the existence of a middle ground
between the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses.9"
The decision also answered a question left open in Witters:9 although
states can indirectly fund religious training through a citizen's private and
individual choice,92 states can now also limit that choice to purely secular
pursuits.93 Thus, the instant court places the issue squarely within the
"joints" of the Religion Clauses. 94
The Court's refusal to apply strict scrutiny to Washington's Promise
Scholarship program deviated from previous logic concerning Free

83. Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1317 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia gives examples of how
Washington can still avoid funding religious education without facially discriminating against
religion. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 1320 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia warns, "When the public's freedom of
conscience is invoked to justify denial of equal treatment, benevolent motives shade into
indifference and ultimately into repression." Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
85. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879-80 (1990).
86. Id. at 879-80.
87. Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1313.
88. Id. Each state can decide to fund religious training just as each state can make exceptions
for sacramental peyote use in its criminal codes. See supratext accompanying notes 33 & 58.
89. SeeLocke, 124 S. Ctat 1313-15.
90. Id. at 1315. "If any room exists between the two Religion Clauses, it must be here." Id.
91. Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481,489-90 (1986). Although
holding the Establishment Clause did not prohibit rehabilitation program participants from using
vocational aid for religious instructions, the Court declined to consider whether the Free Exercise
Clause required Washington to extend such aid to the program participants. Id. at 489.
92. See id. at 488-89; see also Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1311-12.
93. Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1315.
94. Id.
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Exercise challenges.95 Instead of determining if a program singles out
religious conduct, the threshold issue now becomes a question of how
much suppression a state may inflict on religious freedom before a court
must step in; the state's burden is significantly less. The implications this
decision will have on future state and federally funded programs remains
to be seen.96 As it stands, the question of whether a state program may
allow state funding to go to a religious education program is answerable
by the states themselves. This poses a potential risk to state-funded
programs such as school vouchers. 97 It is foreseeable that states with
stricter constitutional standards regarding the establishment of religion will
now refuse to enact such programs. In trying to keep its decision "between
the joints ' of establishment and religious freedom, the Court has
unknowingly narrowed the gap.

95. See supratext accompanying notes 43-52.
96. This case established a profound principle that government may discriminate against
religion on its face. Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1315. If the holding is extended beyond educational
funding issues, the scope of acceptable facial discrimination against religion may be broad. Id. at
1320 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
97. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (upholding constitutionality
of a state-funded program providing educational vouchers for secular education when used at
religiously affiliated schools).
98. Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1311.
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